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Abstract
The domestic environment is a key area for the design and deployment of autonomous systems. Yet research indicates their
adoption is already being hampered by a variety of critical issues including trust, privacy and security. This paper explores how
potential users relate to the concept of autonomous systems in the home and elaborates further points of friction. It makes two
contributions. The first one is of a methodological nature and focuses on the use of provocative utopian and dystopian scenarios
of future autonomous systems in the home. These are used to drive an innovative workshop-based approach to breaching
experiments, which surfaces the usually tacit and unspoken background expectancies implicated in the organisation of everyday
life that have a powerful impact on the acceptability of future and emerging technologies. The other contribution is substantive,
produced through participants’ efforts to repair the incongruity or Breality disjuncture^ created by utopian and dystopian visions,
and highlights the need to build social as well as computational accountability into autonomous systems, and to enable coordi-
nation and control.
Keywords Autonomous systems . Domestic environment . Background expectancies . Breaching experiments . Scenarios .
Utopian and dystopian contra-visions . Reality disjunctures
1 Introduction
Progress in the field of artificial intelligence, machine learning
and ubiquitous computing is paving the way for a range of
domestic systems capable of taking actions autonomously,
largely based on input from sensor-based devices. Systems
such as the NEST smart thermostat [1] which predicts occu-
pancy to regulate temperature or services built around the
Amazon Dash Replenishment API [2], are slowly finding
their way into everyday life. Such systems are said to enable
a more efficient, convenient and healthy lifestyle [3] and spark
market optimism, with analysts suggesting that the global val-
ue of the smart home sector is set to exceed £100 billion by
2022 [4].
However, it is important to treat such predictions with a
degree of caution as they are based on extrapolations from the
current rate of technical progress that fail to take into account
potential non-technical pitfalls that might impact mainstream
adoption. A novel technology has the habit of introducing nov-
el human problems, and domestic autonomous systems are no
exception. Yang and Newman [5] found, for instance, that users
of the NEST thermostat have frequent difficulties in under-
standing its behaviour. Similarly, Rodden et al. [6] found that
the prospective users of autonomous domestic systems were
concerned about the loss of control, and level of personal data
harvesting enabled through widespread sensing.
Studies such as these suggest that social expectations re-
garding the intelligibility and trustworthiness of autonomous
systems are as important to their uptake and use as any tech-
nological benefits. Yet despite these findings, people’s expec-
tations towards domestic autonomous systems remains a rel-
atively poorly understood domain [7]. Following Rohracher’s
[8] call to engage prospective users from the very envisioning
stage of development, we have developed a novel workshop-
based methodology that exploits utopian and dystopian sce-
narios as tools enabling sociologist Harold Garfinkel’s
Bincongruity procedure^ [9] or Bbreaching experiments^
[10] as this procedure is more commonly known. The purpose
of the procedure is to provoke (as in call forth and make
visible) the taken for granted background expectancies that
organise familiar settings of everyday life, which in turn
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impact the adoption and use of new technologies within those
settings.
Accordingly, we created and explored with 32 potential
end-users in focus group workshops a set of provocative
contra-vision [11] scenarios to probe and elicit social expec-
tations that impact the uptake of autonomous systems in the
home. Our analysis of workshop participants’ responses to the
scenarios reveals background expectancies centring on com-
putational accountability and the legibility of autonomous sys-
tem behaviour, social accountability and the compliance of
autonomous behaviours with social norms, coordination and
the need to build the human into the behaviour of autonomous
systems and control. Each of these key topics is formed by and
brings with it a range of ancillary expectations that impact the
adoption of autonomous systems in the home and open up
design possibilities to enable developers to gear autonomous
domestic systems in with the non-technical expectations that
govern their uptake in everyday life.
2 Approach
Our attempt to elicit background expectancies impacting the
adoption of autonomous systems in the home merges
breaching experiments [10] with scenario-based design [12]
and contra-vision [11] to create provocative visions of the
home of the future that intentionally disturb common sense
reasoning and create incongruities or Breality disjunctures^
whose repair surfaces taken for granted background expectan-
cies that impact the uptake of future technologies in everyday
life. Below, we describe each of these three methodological
components and their role in engaging prospective users with
the design of future and emerging technologies.
2.1 Breaching experiments
The notion of breaching experiments has previously been
employed in design to understand Bin the wild^ deployments
of technology [13–16]. The approach derives from Harold
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological brand of sociology [17].
Much like Garfinkel’s portrayal of the sociologist, designers
commonly select Bfamiliar settings^ such as familial house-
holds or workplaces to make prospective technological (rather
than social) systems accountable and to motivate particular
undertakings. Take Mark Weiser’s much-cited Sal scenarios
[18], by way of example.
As Garfinkel [17] observes, no matter what the sociologist
(or the technologist) might have to say about familiar settings,
it is also the case that the members of society have their own
common sense understandings of familiar settings and employ
them as a scheme of interpretation enabling concerted action
and the ongoing conduct of social life. Common sense under-
standings furnish members with background expectancies
drawn upon in situ, as contingencies dictate, to both recognise
events as events-in-familiar-settings and to enforce compli-
ance with expectations of action in familiar settings.
The latter point is of particular consequence to design as it
speaks to the moral ordering of everyday life. It is not then that
background expectancies are only used to interpret and make
sense of events in familiar settings but to assess and enforce
their social acceptability too. We take it that this applies as
much to projected technological events that implicate people
located in familiar settings as it does to actual events here and
now, and that design may therefore be usefully informed
through an investigation of the background expectancies that
members know and use to understand and order familiar set-
tings of everyday life.
Indeed, given the practical indispensability and moral im-
portance of background expectancies, we might expect mem-
bers to have much to say about them. Curiously, however,
Garfinkel observes that the member is typically at a loss to
tell us specifically of what the expectancies consist on any
occasion of inquiry. Indeed, Bwhen we ask him about them,
he has little or nothing to say .^ So, what to do?
In his own efforts to get to grips with the orderliness of
everyday life, Garfinkel tells us that for background expectan-
cies to come into view, one must either be a stranger to its Blife
as usual^ character or become estranged from it. Given that he
wasn’t a stranger, he developed a procedure of estrangement,
which he called the Bincongruity procedure^ [9] or Bbreaching
experiments^ [10, 17]. While these are often associated with
making trouble, as Garfinkel characterised them that way,
proponents of the approach in design have demonstrated that
trouble is not essential or necessary to their conduct [14].
Rather, and to borrow from Garfinkel, we might say that as
seen from the members’ perspective, compliance with back-
ground expectancies turns upon a person’s grasp on what are
commonly seen and understood to be the Bnatural facts of life
in society .^ It follows from this that the firmer a person’s grasp
on the natural facts of life in society—and we assume that a
firm grasp of such facts is key to one’s social competence—
then themore severe should be their Bdisturbance^when those
facts are Bimpugned as a depiction of his (or her) real
circumstances^.
In more prosaic terms, we take it that Bdepictions^ of real
circumstances—of which there may be many forms including
storyboards, scenarios, design fictions, lo-fidelity
prototypes—which breach the Bnatural facts of life in society^
may throw the background expectancies that order everyday
life into relief. These depictions need not necessarily to make
trouble. They need only Bdisturb^ common sense understand-
ings of everyday life. It may then be possible, as it became
possible for Garfinkel, to Bcall forth^ ormake visible the taken
for granted background expectancies that order everyday life.
As detailed in the following sections, we thus seek to exploit
established design methods—scenarios and contra-vision in
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this case—to intentionally disturb common sense reasoning
and surface the usually tacit and unspoken background expec-
tancies that order domestic life and impact autonomous sys-
tems for the home.
2.2 Scenario-based design (SBD)
SBD [19] is a well-established approach towards user-
centred design, which emerged in HCI during the
1990s. Scenarios are stories about people and their ac-
tivities. They help designers focus attention on people
and their tasks, which are often left implicit in techno-
logical renderings (e.g., software specifications) of sys-
tems and their application. Scenarios can be elaborated
on paper, slideshows, video, storyboards, etc. They are
construed of as Bsoft^ prototypes that provide Bminimal
context^ exposing not only the functionality of a pro-
posed system but specific claims about the user experi-
ence [20], which may be assessed by potential end-
users.
In approaching the development of scenarios for au-
tonomous domestic systems, we found ourselves, like
Rodden et al. [6] before us, confronted by a technology
that has Byet to be realised^. However, this is not to say
that we were starting with a blank slate. As Reeves [21]
highlights in examining the origins of ubiquitous com-
puting, technological projections or envisionments are
grounded in a Bmilieu of existing and developing
socio-technical infrastructures and innovations, drawing
upon developments in diverse technologies^.
Accordingly, the initial stages of scenario develop-
ment involved reflecting on research on autonomous
systems and technologies that might impact the home,
some of it based on research we were involved in (e.g.
[22]), some based on research being done by others
(e.g. [5]), mixed with a degree of speculation on our
part about where such developments and technologies
could be heading. Ini t ia l topics thus included
microgeneration and the smart grid (e.g. [23]), automat-
ed scheduling of energy infrastructure use (e.g. [6]),
automated scheduling of appliance use (e.g. [24]) and
appliance diagnostics (e.g. [25]), all of which were
framed by what we perceived as general concern in
the literature with sustainability, and the promise that
the smart and indeed autonomous home of the future
could deliver on this in manifold respects (e.g. [26]).
These initial ideas were subsequently developed into
textual outlines for future scenarios. We developed two
outlines per scenario, one focusing on full automation,
the other on human in the loop following Yang and
Newman’s [5] emphasis on the need to balance system
autonomy with user engagement, e.g.,
2.2.1 Optimising for sustainability—full automation
Donald has just moved into a new smart home. He has
never bothered about the ecology and believes that all
the talk on global warming and environmentalism is
nothing but superstition. One morning when leaving
his house to go to work, he’s horrified to find that his
car has disappeared overnight. He rushes back into the
house frantically searching for his phone to call the po-
lice. Suddenly he hears a voice coming from the
speakers of his smart home IoT system. The voice an-
nounces that Donald’s car has been found to be produc-
ing an unacceptably high level of CO2 emissions. To
prevent further damage to the environment, the IoT sys-
tem has sent the car to a local recycling company. As a
replacement, the system has ordered a bike, which is
waiting for Donald in his garage. He is told that not only
is a bike far more environmentally friendly, but riding a
bike will also help him address his increasingly high
cholesterol levels.
2.2.2 Optimising for sustainability—user engagement
One morning after waking up, Donald’s smart phone
starts reading out a voice message informing him that
his car is producing a dangerously high level of CO2
emissions. He is recommended to have his car recycled
and get a new one. The application offers him a list of
nearby recycling companies along with contact details.
Donald laughs out at the message and decides to ignore
it. While preparing a breakfast, his smartphone delivers
another message. This time it urges him to do something
about his high cholesterol levels, stating that his food is
not particularly healthy. While getting ready to leave his
house, Donald lights a cigarette. This triggers another
voice message and sends it echoing across the house. It
explains that smoking is not only unhealthy, but also
pollutes the environment. Angrily, Donald slams the
doors shut and departs to his work. Donald endures
multiple similar messages throughout the day.
Nonetheless, in the long run he finds it difficult to ignore
all of these recommendations. His lifestyle is gradually
and subtly adjusted towards a greater sustainability.
The scenarios included microgenerated energy production
and use, optimising energy consumption, home automation
(including turning lights, heating and security systems on
and off), diagnosing faulty domestic appliances and, as above,
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optimising for sustainability. In the course of reviewing them,
it became evident that the absurdities [27] they contained
might be something we could leverage more productively if
we adopted a contra-vision approach to render provocative
utopian and dystopian visions instead of contrasting full auto-
mation versus human in the loop.
The scenarios were subsequently revised, with itera-
tion involving other members of our research lab who
were engaged in smart home research and IoT device
construction to ensure the feasibility of what we were
proposing. While centred around hypothetical domestic
situations, we nevertheless felt it important that the sce-
narios not drift too far beyond what could reasonably be
expected from such systems if our findings were to be
of any practical use. The result of the revisioning pro-
cess was that we ended up with visual scenarios (e.g.
Fig.1) focusing on four partially overlapping areas
where autonomous systems are expected to make a sub-
stantial impact in the home:
Temperature regulation – The use of wireless sensor net-
works for optimisation of in-
door temperature is a well-
documented area in ubiquitous
computing [28] and one that is
well within the reach of current
technological capabilities.
Studies of emerging solutions
have demonstrated the technical
viability of regulating indoor
temperature automatically by
monitoring environmental vari-
ables, such as occupancy [29].
Yet research has likewise found
that such autonomous systems
run the risk of rendering their
operation unintelligible to users,
which in turn can result in con-
fusion and impede a sense of
trust [1]. Our scenarios feature
an autonomous system that not
only controls heating but also
ventilation and air conditioning.
It explores the tension between
autonomous regulation driven
by sustainability and its impact
on inhabitants.
Auto purchases – Various auto-purchasing and reordering
mechanisms represent another autono-
mous technology with a potentially
strong impact on future smart homes.
Semi-automatic solutions, such as
the Amazon Dash button are already
showing promising results [2] and
studies suggest fully AI controlled
restocking solutions in the future
[4]. If coupled with auto-delivery
systems, these technologies
Fig. 1 Donald and his autonomous home
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could, for example, be used to prevent essential food items
from running out by keeping the fridge stocked. On the other
hand, studies have also been flagging that physical sensing of
products in the home, computational learning and the prediction
of need is problematic, making it difficult for fully autonomous
systems to achieve desirable results on a consistent basis [30].
Our scenario explores the tension between auto-reordering and
consumer choice and control.
Energy regulation – Many households are already starting
to benefit from microgeneration tech-
nologies, such as solar panels, which
not only produce energy in an envi-
ronmentally friendly manner but also
help keep the electricity bills low. The
fluctuating availability of alternative
energy sources, such as solar power,
requires continuous monitoring and
regulation of consumption. The dele-
gation of such activities to autono-
mous systems represents a viable al-
ternative that has already been ex-
plored in previous studies [6, 31].
Studies have at the same time also
been suggesting that the contingencies
associated with the everyday life make
a seamless operation of fully autono-
mous solutions problematic [24]. Our
scenario explores the tension between
autonomous energy regulation in the
home and its impact on inhabitants.
Lifestyle monitoring – Sensors are capable of monitoring
multiple parameters of our life
styles, ranging from biodata, such
as heart rate or sleep patterns, to
environmental variables such as hu-
midity and air pollution. This in
turn enables a range of solutions
promoting a healthy lifestyle by
giving the user visual or auditory
reminders and clues that are
intended to influence their behav-
iour [32]. Such solutions have been
noted by previous research as
representing a double-edged sword.
Yang et al. for instance have found
that such systems might succeed at
least temporarily in adjusting user’s
patterns of behaviour but are prone
to causing new problems, such in-
advertently providing poor or
misleading recommendations [33].
Our scenario explores the tension
between autonomous regulation of
one’s life style and individual
autonomy.
2.3 Contra-vision
As noted above, we complemented our scenario-based
design activities with a contra-vision approach [11].
This conveys two contrasting yet comparable represen-
tations of the same technology on the premise that this
can help elicit a wider range of reactions from prospec-
tive users than what could normally be gained by con-
veying only one perspective. The point and purpose of
these contra-visions is not to enable exploration of im-
plementation problems that might occur as users seek to
incorporate new technologies, such as autonomous sys-
tems and virtual agents, into their daily lives. Rather,
and as Mancini et al. (ibid.) put it, contra-vision repre-
sents a particularly valuable method when researchers
have reason to believe that new technology is likely to
raise subtle personal, cultural and social issues that can
Bpotentially jeopardise its adoption^. We thus developed
a number of utopian and dystopian contra-vision scenar-
ios covering the four areas outlined above, which are
further elaborated in Table 1 below.
From our own perspective, portraying technology in a
purposefully dystopian manner conveys a vision of the
future which is essentially broken. Whereas, portraying
it in a purposefully utopian manner conveys idealised
and idealistic visions of the future. Neither is right, as
in correct, and they are not meant to be. Rather, both
represent polar extremes (absurd contrasts) which are
intentionally designed to disrupt common sense reason-
ing and surface the unspoken background expectancies
that order what Garfinkel [17] called Ban obstinately
familiar world^ and in turn impact the adoption of fu-
ture and emerging technologies in everyday life [34].
The combination and repurposing of scenario-based
design and contra-vision thus enable a novel approach
to the conduct of breaching experiments that provides
an early development stage framework for evaluating
new technologies at minimal costs while eliciting rich
end-user insights. The utopian and dystopian characters
of the scenarios allow us to provoke and disturb com-
mon sense reasoning, which in turn create a Breality
disjuncture^ [35] i.e. incongruous experiences of the
world that motivate efforts at resolution and repair. It
is in repairing the reality disjuncture that the taken for
granted background expectancies that people use to
make sense of and order familiar settings and scenes
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in everyday life are Bcalled forth^ [17] and thus become
available to our consideration.
3 Provoking reaction and reflection
We adopted a focus group, workshop approach to assess the
contra-vision scenarios with potential end-users of domestic
autonomous systems. We chose this approach because group
dynamics can help people to explore and clarify participants’
views in ways that would be less easily achieved, if at all, in a
one to one interview [36].
3.1 Participants
Thirty-two people agreed to take part in 2 focus group work-
shops; 20 were staff members at our place of work (a university)
who volunteered on the basis of a free lunch (pizza), and 12were
attendees at the 2016 Mozilla Festival, who volunteered out of
interest in the topic. The participants were a mixed bag of de-
signers, IT professionals, enthusiasts, PhD students, researchers
and academics, male and female. As Twidale et al. [37] put it,
B… a possible objection to this would be that the small
number of end-users might be unrepresentative.
Table 1 Overview of the contra-vision scenarios
Utopian vision Dystopian vision
Scenario 1: Temperature regulation
Temperature in Donald’s home is 
regulated automatically, without the need 
for any intervention. Everything is taken 
care of in the background, so that Donald 
can spend his precious time on more 
important things.
The windows in Donald’s smart home 
are being opened automatically to 
ventilate and regulate indoor 
temperature. The system operates fully 
autonomously without explicitly notifying 
its user of the variables that are being 
taken into account to determine whether 
to open the window or not. This in turn 
results in a situation where from the 
user’s point of view the windows are being opened seemingly 
randomly.  
Scenario 2: Auto-purchases
The smart home is also monitoring food 
items available in the fridge. Whenever a 
particular item is running out, the system 
reorders it to make sure that critical items 
are always available.
There are frequent mismatches 
between what the system determines is 
needed and what Donald actually 
wants. Moreover, since the system 
spends money on his behalf, Donald is 
slowly losing control over his expenses.
Scenario 3: Energy regulation
The domestic system automatically 
optimises energy consumption in 
Donald’s home in order to keep electricity 
bills low while contributing to a 
sustainable society.
Electrical devices, such as lights, are 
being turned off without warning, 
sometimes even in the middle of being 
used by Donald. This leads to chaotic 
situations and even puts Donald in 
danger.
Scenario 4: Lifestyle monitoring
Through a network of sensors, the 
autonomous system monitors a range of 
variables pertaining to the lifestyle of its 
users. The information serves as a basis 
for recommendations and even fully 
proactive actions, such as regulation of 
air humidity.
The system’s goal of enabling a 
healthier environment leads to 
catastrophic consequences as it 
proactively decides to send away 
Donald’s old car for recycling and 
replace it with an electric one in a bid to 
reduce the household’s carbon footprint.
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However, in one sense, no end-user is unrepresentative
in that all end-users’ viewpoints and requirements re-
flect a context in which the system may have to
function^.
The authors also note that the Blimited size^ of a study does
not stop Bmajor problems^ being Bdiscovered and
generalised^, a matter we will return to in discussion.
3.2 Focus group sessions
Each of our focus group sessions ran for approximately
75 min and consisted of three key stages:
3.2.1 The utopian vision
– We initiated each session by presenting the utopian ver-
sion of our scenarios. While constituting one of our
contra-vision points, this stage also served as an overview
of key technology concepts and of how these might ide-
ally be implemented into the home of the future to im-
prove everyday life. Participants were free to interrupt our
presentation at any time.
3.2.2 The dystopian vision
– Participants were subsequently introduced to the dystopi-
an vision, depicting a broken smart home infrastructure.
The aim here was to open up utopian visions to scrutiny
and encourage critical discussion and debate. Just as with
the previous stage, participants were free to react or raise
questions whenever they wanted.
3.2.3 Open discussion
– Participants were also encouraged to reflect on and dis-
cuss what they saw. We initiated this stage by asking a
broad question, such as Bwould you be willing to live in a
smart home like the one depicted in our scenarios? If not,
what would make it work for you?^ Participants were
given leeway to comment and respond to each other’s
thoughts and reflections, with occasional interruptions
from us to ask additional probing questions around topics
raised by participants.
The scenarios were presented via a slideshow and initially
met with enthusiasm. The notion of augmenting domestic life
with a range of technologies that operate autonomously was
generally well received, and the issues postulated by our dys-
topian scenarios were frequently waved aside as temporary
technical limitations that would eventually be sorted out. It
wasn’t until participants begun to relate the proposed technol-
ogies to their own lives and to the various social situations that
might occur in their homes that perceived problems started to
emerge.
Both focus group sessions were recorded on audio and
subsequently transcribed. The transcriptions were used to ex-
amine the topical concerns that populated our participant’s
talk and their reasoning about autonomous systems in the
home. Strictly speaking, we did not subject the transcripts to
thematic analysis in order to Bidentify patterns within the
data^ [38] but instead adopted an ethnomethodological orien-
tation to identify the different orders of mundane reasoning
exhibited in participants’ talk and the endogenous topics elab-
orated by them (rather than by us as analysts) in the course of
their conversations [39]. It is towards explicating the different
orders of mundane reasoning and the topical concerns that
characterise them that we turn below and elaborate through
sections B4 to 8^.
4 Computational accountability
The importance of designing systems that are accountable to
their users has long been recognised in HCI [40, 41]. While
the word Baccountable^ in ordinary English is often associated
with justification, in HCI, it generally refers to the legibility or
intelligibility of computer systems to end-users [42]. HCI re-
searchers have coined the te rm Bcomputa t iona l
accountability^ [43] to distinguish this specific kind of ac-
countability. As can be seen in (anonymised) conversational
extracts from the focus group sessions below, issues surround-
ing computational accountability of autonomous systems are
not only concerned with accounting for the system’s behav-
iour, but also with what is involved in providing an account,
and particularly with making the motives and reasons for the
actions of autonomous systems transparent along with the
kind of transparency required to provide a sufficient account.
4.1 Reasoning about accountability
In considering the idea that autonomous systems could take
proactive actions to improve the ecology and sustainability of
the household, our participants exhibited a concern in their
talk with the legibility of the smart home’s behaviour to
Donald.
Jack: It depends how the whole system is being framed
for Donald. So if he wants to get a really good deal, if
he’s been told his house would do things to minimise the
amount of energy he uses, he might think Bfine^, be-
cause he wants to keep his bills down. But if he is told
Byour house will do things because it is trying to be
sustainable and environmentally friendly ,^ he might feel
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like Bwell, I don’t care; I’d rather it do what I want it to
do for me.^
Jill: I wouldn’t like to live in a house where I could not
account for things that were happening.
This simple interchange between Jack and Jill reflects broad
concern amongst our participants with the accountability of
autonomous system behaviours. While seeing the potential
benefits of autonomous systems, no one wanted to live in an
environment where what happened there—the automatic
modification of heating levels, the turning on and off of lights,
the opening and closing of doors and windows, etc.—could
not, as Jill puts it, be accounted for. It seems clear then that a
critical background expectancy impacting the uptake of auton-
omous systems is that their behaviours will be accountable to
end-users. But what exactly does accountability consist of or
require?
4.2 Reasoning about motives
A key background expectancy closely bound up with compu-
tational accountability became perspicuous when participants
were considering the scenario in which the autonomous sys-
tem in Donald’s home decided to replace his car with a newer
one. It did this to reduce Donald’s carbon footprint without
asking him for permission or giving any other prior
notification.
Phil: But who is it that’s telling you that you need to
change your car? It could be some kind of a company
that you pay to service it and they recommend you to
change the car. Is their motive that you're paying for
their service? Or is their motive like Blet's sell cars based
on some dodgy grey statistics that we made up.^
Alan: People get usually very emotionally attached to
their cars.
Sally: You might imagine you're in one of those
schemes where you get the latest thing, and the latest
thing is forced on you, but you have sort of a nostalgic
attachment to the previous thing. BThis is obsolete now,
we’ll give you the newest one automatically.^ You
would not like that kind of autonomy.
As qouted, Phil makes visible, Bmotive^matters inmaking the
behaviour of autonomous systems accountable. Of particular
relevance and concern is the Btelling^ of specific motives that
drive specific autonomous behaviours, and on whose behalf
they are acted upon. The Btelling^ of just what, just why and
just who is important and speaks to the active provision of an
account as a preface to autonomous behaviour rather than a
bolt-on explanation delivered (like Donald’s car) after the fact,
for as Sally puts it, BYou would not like that kind of
autonomy .^ Accountability thus becomes an important part
of the conduct of autonomous system behaviours, rather than
a narrative that is subsequently appended to action and speaks
more generally of the need to build transparency into the be-
haviours of autonomous systems.
4.3 Reasoning about transparency
The background expectation that transparency should be built
into the behaviours of autonomous systems became apparent
when participants were confronted with the scenario of tem-
perature regulation in Donald’s house, which the system does
(in part) by automatically opening and closing windows.
David: If you live in a climate where it gets really hot
and you need to get cooler air in the evening or morning
– if these windows open when I would open them – then
great, why not. But why does the slide say the windows
are being opened seemingly randomly? That means the
system is faulty, the system is not opening themwhen he
would like to open them.
Sarah: I guess it kind of works because the windows are
opening when it’s too hot and closing when it is too
cold.
David: Who defines when it is too hot? For him?
Donald at some point wants the windows open because
for him it’s sometimes too hot or too cold. So if it is
seemingly random to him, then the system is not behav-
ing properly.
Like Phil, in raising the matter of motive, David clearly begs
the question, on whose behalf is an autonomous system act-
ing?With that goes the expectation that their actions will serve
end-user need. But whether acting on Donald or some other
unidentified actor’s part, David also makes it perspicuous that
should an autonomous system’s actions appear Bseemingly
random^, it would not be seen to be Bbehaving properly ,^
where Bproperly^ clearly means its actions are intelligible
rather than discernibly Brandom^ and something that has to
be guessed at as Sarah has to do.
So not only is it expected that an autonomous system
operates in tune with the preferences of its users, but it is also
expected that the grounds upon which it operates on any oc-
casion are visible to end-users. It might otherwise be said that
the telling or provision of an account extends to incorporate
both the reasons for action as well as the motive, which is to
recognise that motive alone does not adequately account for
action; motive may account for what occasions action (e.g.
temperature regulation), whereas reason also accounts for par-
ticular actions done with respect to motive (e.g. opening win-
dows to cool the environment). Background expectancies re-
garding transparency thus extend the accountability require-
ment to include the in vivo accomplishment of autonomous
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behaviour, i.e., the doing of autonomous behaviour and pro-
vision of reasons that account for what is being done.
4.4 Reasoning about the nature of transparency
A further background expectancy became apparent in partic-
ipants’ reflection on the previous temperature regulation sce-
nario, which concerns the kind of transparency considered
necessary to understanding the behaviour of autonomous
systems.
Researcher:Would you like to live in a house like this?
Megan: Not with Donald.
(General laughter)
Harry:The question is whether you would be willing to
live in a house where you cannot fathom the things
going on around you. Where the house is behaving in
ways you cannot understand.
Megan: But that happens all the time. My house is too
cold and I don’t know why.
John: Well, we all live in houses we don’t understand,
unless you know what’s going on in a gas boiler.
Harry: But you do understand the thermostat, because
it is really simple.
It would be easy to think that in expecting the reasons for an
autonomous system’s behaviour to be made transparent, end-
users are also expecting designers to open up a black box of
complexity. The above extract disabuses us of this notion. Just
as most of us do not understand Bwhat’s going on in a gas
boiler^ and would not understand even if the underlying rea-
sons were carefully spelt out to us, then so it will be with
autonomous systems: end-users do not expect to understand
the detailed reasoning implicated in their inner workings, and
they do not expect to have that level of insight because they
have no practical need of it.
A rather more "simple" level transparency is instead re-
quired for the practical purposes of end-users, of the kind
provided by a thermostat, for example. Other examples
discussed by our participants included articulating the
Bagenda^ of an autonomous system and the underlying
Bbusiness model^, instead of the intricate technical processes
going on under the hood, though as noted above, such matters
will need to be manifested in the conduct of autonomous sys-
tem behaviours and not merely as after the fact appendages.
5 Social accountability
While discussion amongst our participants was initially oriented
to technical considerations of autonomous system’s behaviours
and their intelligibility, it became increasingly apparent as the
conversation progressed that they were also holding the
autonomous systems depicted in our scenarios accountable to
the broader social context within which they were prospectively
situated. Social accountability extends beyond expectations
concerning the legibility of autonomous behaviour to expecta-
tions concerning the appropriateness of autonomous behaviour
within a social setting.
5.1 Reasoning about acceptability
Concern with social accountability as distinct to computation-
al accountability became evident in participant’s consideration
of the automatic temperature regulation scenario:
Rachel: You wouldn’t like the windows opening when
you’re not at home, regardless how hot it is.
Megan: Depends what kind of window it is; not with
that kind of window (points to the large open window in
the presentation slide).
Ben: If you live close by the road, with cars going by
while you try to listen to something…
Adam: There are also these big bees outdoors ...
The extract makes it perspicuous that understanding why an
autonomous system is behaving in the way it is (e.g. why it’s
opening windows) does not automatically mean that end-users
will find this behaviour acceptable. On the contrary, people evi-
dently entertain background expectancies regarding the appropri-
ateness of a system’s behaviour. Opening windows Bwhen
you’re not at home^, or Bwhile you try to listen to something^
or with those Bbig bees outdoors^ all point to the need for au-
tonomous systems to not just be intelligible in their own right but
also in relation to the specific social context within which they
operate. Their behaviours, in other words, need to be intelligibly
appropriate given the specific social conditions in which their
actions are embedded Bhere and now^ (no one is at home, people
are busy, there are hazards outside, etc.).
5.2 Reasoning about agency and entitlement
Background expectancies bound up with the appropriateness
of system behaviour also turn upon considerations of agency
and entitlement, as became perspicuous when participants
were confronted with the notion that people could order prod-
ucts simply by talking to the autonomous home through a
voice interface:
Sam: I can imagine with the voice thing, if it would
actually start buying stuff… that would be really bad!
Sue: If you’ve got your five-year old kids in the house
alone they might go like Bchocolate and popcorn!^ and
the voice replies BOK!^ and off we go!
Jill: It should be able to know who is actually going to
end up paying for it, because there are those examples of
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kids that run up hundreds of pounds on app purchases
because their parents left out an iPad.
As the extract makes visible, it is not only the social
conditions in which autonomous systems are embedded
that impact the appropriateness of their behaviour, who
is implicated in those behaviours also counts. Clearly,
not everyone has the same rights and privileges in the
home and our participants held autonomous systems ac-
countable to mundane expectations regarding how ev-
eryday life in the home is socially organised. Thus,
and for example, an autonomous system should not re-
order Bchocolate and popcorn^ just because it has run
out, and the kids want more. Rather, any such action
should be accountable to the party who is Bactually
going to end up paying for it^. An autonomous system
embedded in the fabric of domestic life must effectively
become a social agent whose actions comply with the
mundane expectations that order domestic life. Put sim-
ply, the system needs to act in a manner consistent with
that which would be expected of a responsible human
agent.
5.3 Reasoning about trustworthiness
A key social accountability expectancy concerns the
trustworthiness of autonomous systems and whose inter-
ests they serve, as become visible when participants
were discussing auto-replenishing systems capable of
reordering worn-out household items:
Researcher: So the next problem that Donald encoun-
tered was the problem where random products were
being delivered to his doorstep automatically. He didn’t
order anything and everything was paid for without his
consent.
Jill: So that’s what I wanted to mention that we’re actu-
ally assuming that you trust your house or you trust your
personal assistant. We assume that they do the right
thing.
John: Say your washing machine gets broken and your
house has purchased this specific spare part from one
specific supplier. But that particular brand is maybe not
in your best interest, because you know, it spoils
quicker. It’s not in your best interest, but it’s in the best
interest of the guys who made the washing machine, or
some other company out there.
As John makes visible, even if the actions of the auton-
omous home are intelligible and the end-user knows
why it has done what it has done (e.g. bought a re-
placement part because the washer was broken), it is
not evident that doing so is in the end-user’s interest.
On the contrary, it might Bbe in the best interests of the
guys who made the washing machine, or some other
company out there^. There were, as we have already
seen, multiple instances where our participants questioned
whether the behaviour of an autonomous system could really
be trusted and its actions carried out on the end-user’s behalf.
Our participants expected that external interests would exert
considerable influence on what goes on in the autonomous
home and found this deeply problematic. It is critical then that
autonomous systems not only articulate motives and reasons
but that their actions are clearly accountable to end-user inter-
ests. But how?
5.4 Reasoning about risks
Clearly, autonomous systems raise the risk of widespread ex-
ploitation from an end-user viewpoint, championing the inter-
ests of external parties at the expense of those who live in the
autonomous home. Another closely related key area of risk
concerns the potential for widespread data harvesting and the
risk this poses to privacy.
Simon: The thing about AI technology is that all of this
stuff is data and it’s stored somewhere and it knows all
these things about you and potentially that makes you a
target for an attack.
Researcher: You never know who else is watching?
John: Or who else has a relationship with your house.
Wilma: If we start encouraging smart homes to have
their own server, so all your data goes back to your
cloud and that sends a limited amount of data to the
people that need it, once that becomes a viable option,
stuff like the legal requirements around how you store
people’s data, and how you make this clear to them, is
going to make it so that if a company is asking for
detailed data from your life, then that might be some-
thing why you choose not to do business with them.
Martin: You need an on-off switch and an awareness
model so that you can close your data from going out
and you’re aware of what data is going where.
Everything is happening, I mean the Internet of
Things, things that are in your home sending data of
yours without you realising it. Or providers giving you
a service without actually explaining their business
model is another problem.
In considering the implications of our scenarios, our partici-
pants’ discussion reflected widespread social concern about
the impact of intelligent technologies on everyday life and
Bwho else has a relationship with your house^ enabled
through current cloud-based autonomous infrastructure. Our
participants expect that Bwhat data is going where^ be made
accountable to them by the autonomous home. They posit
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variousmechanisms enabling this, including local data storage
mechanisms that make end-users aware of data flow and
which allow them to Blimit^ the flow of data and Bclose^ it
off, as well as Blegal^ mechanisms that enable end-user’s
choice. Such mechanisms might in turn make the behaviours
of autonomous systems in the home accountable to end-user’s
interests.
6 Coordination
Clearly, our participants had background expectancies regard-
ing what was and is acceptable in their homes and hold auton-
omous systems accountable to them. Expectations that auton-
omous systems will behave appropriately in relation to social
conditions, social actors and end-user’s interests require that
autonomous systems coordinate their actions with the inhab-
itants of the home. However, unlike traditional computer ap-
plications, many autonomous systems are designed to work
on the periphery of user’s attention. Instead of simply
responding to instructions obtained through manual input
from the user, these systems typically have to act on sensed
data collected from their surroundings. Nonetheless, some
kind of interface is required and we presented a range of al-
ternatives in the course of exploring our scenarios including
traditional GUI dashboards, voice-based interfaces, virtually
embodied agents and even humanoid robots. While the latter
were generally seen as too futuristic, the former was seen as
relevant to enabling coordination.
6.1 Reasoning about voice control
Given the current turn towards voice-based interfaces
(e.g. Amazon’s Alexa and Google Home), much of the
discussion about coordination inevitably revolved
around the potential of voice interfaces, though not
unproblematically.
Researcher: Another type of interface is the voice-
based interface, which allows you to interact with a
computer in a very natural way by speaking. It can ba-
sically wake you up or contact you whenever, it basical-
ly just shouts out recommendations or it could use
something like motion sensors to deliver relevant mes-
sages whenever you’re near a device.
Tom: Personally I find voice a little intrusive. I don’t
even like phone calls. And the prospect of this thing
going BHey Tom, you need to eat carrots!^ just while
I’m talking or doing something else is not something
I’m interested in.
Sarah: Imagine if you have visitors in the house, so
embarrassing!
Tom: It’s not what I would want.
Henry: It depends if this is about all these things
shouting at me or is this a single agent I’m interacting
with by voice. I sit down inmy living room, and I’m like
Bhey voice-thing tell me the things I need to know about
things^, and that’s useful.
Fred: Let’s just paint a picture where you sit with your
friends and you’re eating some pizza, and it says BHey,
can I chat with you in another room?^ And you go there
and it says BOn recommendations from the NHS
[National Health Service] blah, blah, blah. You might
want to do this. Do you want to do it?^ You say yes or
no. So it could be like a communication between you
and your house.
Mike: I’m just visualising my fridge saying BYou guys
had an awful lot of beer tonight, maybe ...^ you know?
Claire:What keeps coming up is that it’s a relationship.
Like the house is – the house becomes a housemaid. It
might have your best interest at heart, but if it’s socially
awkward, or just does things wrong, brings in a bad
mood, then it is a bad housemaid. So I think until you
can have some form of natural feeling interface which
isn’t just going to be insulting you, or telling you to do
stuff or muttering at you or treating you like a child then
that’s gonna be a big issue. Making a house that can do
something is easy. Making a house work out whether it
should is, I think, a lot more difficult.
As our participants’ talk makes clear, just as automatic behav-
iours (e.g. opening windows) are socially accountable to back-
ground expectancies regarding appropriateness then so too are
coordinative behaviours. Context awareness is key. As Tom
puts it, voice-based interventions would be inappropriate
Bwhile I’m talking^ or Bdoing something else^. Such inter-
ventions are seen as being not only potentially inappropriate
but Bembarrassing^ if the underlying systems are not aware of
the social circumstances to hand e.g. that Byou have visitors in
the house^. This, of course, is not to say that voice-based
coordination could not be useful, enabling autonomous sys-
tems to be seen as an Bagent^ or Bhousemaid^working in your
Bbest interest^, but that usefulness needs to be balanced with a
sensitivity to social context, as underscored by Claire.
6.2 Reasoning about timeliness
An issue that is intimately bound up with social context and
coordinating autonomous systems with people is the timeli-
ness of coordinative actions.
Matthew: If I just got home and I’m carrying 15 shop-
ping bags, I don’t want a thing to say BMatthew, have
you bought carrots?^ It’s a real problem, a system that is
going to interrupt me. A real person looking at me
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carrying 15 shopping bags would not say BHave you
bought carrots?^ I would be angry!
John: Like here, if the system is telling me BDo you
need a car?^ that is not something you need to be told
while you are in the car.
Henry: It’s fundamental that this is about asking for
information at a time when it is, you know, not out of
tune, and there is something you can do about it.
Evidently, an autonomous system that seeks to coordinate
with users will be seen as problematic if its actions lack sen-
sible timing. The ability to Binterrupt^ at the right time thus
becomes a vital component of acceptability. As Henry puts it,
it is Bfundamental^ that system behaviour is Bnot out of tune^
with human behaviour and occurs when there is opportunity to
do something about it. Achieving coordination, in this sense,
thus becomes a matter of orchestrating or synchronising sys-
tem behaviours with the user’s situation.
6.3 Reasoning about situated action
As the following extract makes perspicuous, there is more to
synchronising system actions with the user’s situation than
being aware of what is happening Bhere and now .^
Researcher: Would you accept a house that tries to
change you and your habits?
Sarah:When it comes to healthy lifestyle, like you said,
you’re not going to do it unless you want to. The house
can try, but it should never force you. You should opt in
to wanting to change. So you should have thing like BI
want to have a more healthy lifestyle, but I don’t know
how to do that, can you help me house?^
Researcher: So you’re gravitating towards a recom-
mendation system rather than a totalitarian smart home?
Sarah: It definitely has to ask for information first, be-
cause if it starts recommending you stuff without know-
ing your situation – like for example, I could be eating a
lot of junk food because I’m working 60 hours a week,
and healthy food right now is just not makingme happy;
bad lifestyle to get me through my long work schedule.
And although the smart thing here would probably be
for the house to suggest that I don’t work so hard, here
what it’s doing instead is making me more miserable.
Context awareness is not just about being sensitive to social
circumstance and timing interruptions to gear in which the
current situation. That is to say, context awareness is not sim-
ply a momentary concern for people, but something that has a
temporal horizon—e.g. BI’m working 60 hours a week^.
Coordination thus extends and turns upon gearing in with
such things as a Blong work schedule^. This will require that
autonomous systems are furnished with Binformation^ about
the user’s situation to enable the effective coordination of
system behaviours.
7 Control
Control is the final major topic surfaced in our focus group
sessions. In spite of dealing with autonomous systems, i.e.
solutions designed to carry out tasks on the user’s behalf, it
became increasingly clear as the conversation unfolded that
manual control mechanisms enabling users to customise or
even terminate system actions would greatly contribute to-
wards the overall acceptability of autonomous systems in a
domestic context.
7.1 Reasoning about customisation
The need for autonomous systems to be furnished with
information about the user’s situation to enable effective
coordination raises the issue of customisation as a dis-
tinct form of control.
Sam: I must say you have painted a really stupid auton-
omous system. You paint autonomous homes as some-
thing negative.
Dave: It’s intentionally provocative. The point is that it
is extreme because if we talk about less extreme, the
responses would be less interesting.
Sam: But it’s not realistic.
Dave: It is realistic. If you live in social housing, they
will put solar panels on your roof without asking you.
They can turn off your electricity without much notice.
You’ve got central heating which can shut off if there is
not enough demand. There are all these things, OK. If
you own your own home and are in full control of it,
you’re fine, but if you imagine a managed house, which
a lot of people live in, then it’s not impractical to suggest
that some of this might happen. So it’s not too far re-
moved from what the reality is.
Sam: I can’t imagine anybody programming an auton-
omous system in a house that is this stupid.
Dave:Really? How long have you been doing computer
science stuff?
(Group laughter)
Sam: I have faith in the fact that we can build working
systems so there’s a level of autonomy, a level of smart-
ness, that’s the thing. I think in this realm of setting
things and turning lights off and stuff, I think it should
not do that unless you want it.
Researcher: OK, so another problem that Donald ran
into was the energy regulation issue. In the first scenario,
the smart home started to shut down all the devices
automatically. Whereas now it needs some input from
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the user. So a dashboard would probably look some-
thing like this. It would show a popup message encour-
aging you to do something and offering to take the ap-
propriate actions on your behalf.
Jack: I kind of like the negotiations in the message
interface.
Claire: But there’s an awful lot of complexity in that…
Sarah: I’m sorry to interrupt you, because we’re
saying that all these things would be ongoing if
not scheduled for a specific time. Why would it
not be possible that he schedules exactly the time
he wants all these events? You know, so that - of
course there might be emergency so he’ll have to
change the schedule, but this does not happen ev-
ery day I guess – so he could schedule like every
day I want this to be done every time right before
I go to bed or before I visit someone or do some-
thing else.
The dispute between Sam and Dave about how realistic our
scenarios of the autonomous home might ultimately surface
the expectation that an autonomous system should not do
things Bunless you want it^. This triggered discussion of dash-
boards as a means of users configuring Bappropriate actions^.
The expectation here is that customisation should extend be-
yond system messages encouraging users to do things to en-
able users to Bschedule events^ themselves. In speaking about
scheduling events Bright before I go to bed^ or Bbefore I visit
someone^ or Bdo something else^, there is a strong sense in
which Sarah speaks of customisation as a means of gearing the
behaviours of autonomous systems in with the rhythms and
routines that are implicated in the user’s everyday life.
7.2 Reasoning about direct control
On a final point of note, our participants also expected that
they would be able to exercise direct control over the behav-
iour of autonomous systems. This was surfaced at various
points throughout their discussions but perhaps none so point-
edly as here:
Paul:You know there is a lot of ideology in the structure
of the problem itself. A lot of things are biased ideolog-
ically to start with. I see it as a move towards a consum-
erist attitude that I don’t see very likely to work. They
can sell you a car that won’t start if you drank too much.
You might think it’s a very good idea until the day that
you have somebody who is bleeding to death and you
drank a couple of beers. You want to run to the hospital,
but the car doesn’t start. The most important thing on a
machine is the off button. Of course, you could use it if
you drink a couple of pints too much at the pub, maybe,
if you’re irresponsible. But it’s your responsibility, so
you must have an off switch.
John: How do you turn these systems off basically? I
mean I appreciate your point, I do think technology
should have an off switch, I’m just wondering, what
form does this off switch take? If your magical smart
future car has an off switch, you don’t want that off
switch to occur when you’re driving 70 miles an hour
down the highway.
Claire: It’s also about all the smart features, I mean how
dumb do youmake it. If you had a smart on and off, well
now I can exceed 70 miles per hour and I can drive
drunk, but I can’t use cruise control or I can’t use auto-
matic gearbox, because I made it into a totally dumb car.
So I think it’s definitely a sliding scale of how smart do I
want this car to be.
The ability to exercise direct control and shut down an auton-
omous system is evidently an expectation that people hold,
but it is not at all a simplistic on/off expectation. While some
circumstances may warrant an Boff switch^ (e.g. overriding an
autonomous system when Byou have somebody who is bleed-
ing to death^), others that may put users at significant risk
(such as switching off while Bdriving 70 miles an hour down
the highway^) do not. The issue of control is not only one of
balancing risk with human autonomy, however. Bound up
with this is the expectation of granular control, of a Bsliding
scale^ of smartness that can be determined by human beings
to enable a better fit between autonomous systems and the
particular human circumstances in which they are embedded.
8 What is seen in the breach
Our utopian and dystopian scenarios depicting an autonomous
future home have been intentionally created and employed to
enable breaching experiments that disturb common sense un-
derstandings of domestic life. The disturbance creates reality
disjunctures and surface taken for granted background expec-
tancies in participants’ efforts to repair them. These back-
ground expectancies are ordinarily used by people to under-
stand and order action and interaction in what sociologist
Harold Garfinkel [17] called Ban obstinately familiar world^.
That is, a world that members are Bdemonstrably responsive
to^ in mundane interaction but are ordinarily Bat a loss^ to tell
us just what the expectancies that lend commonplace scenes
their familiar, life-as-usual character consist of (ibid.).
Our scenarios have provided means, motive and opportu-
nity to (gently) prod and provoke, and for members to thereby
articulate and reflect on, expectations at work in domestic life
that are ordinarily taken for granted and left unsaid. In doing
so, the participants in our study have elaborated distinct chal-
lenges for future technological visions. These include the
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expectations that the behaviours of autonomous systems will
be accountable, that their behaviours are responsive to context
and gear in with end-user behaviour, and that people can in-
tervene in their operations. More specifically, we can say that
our participants expect that autonomous systems will be com-
putationally accountable, socially accountable and that coor-
dination and control are enabled. Below, we consider each of
these expectations, and their implications for design, in more
detail.
8.1 Computational accountability
As noted above, computational accountability refers to the
legibility or intelligibility of system behaviours. To borrow
from our participants, it will not do for the behaviours of
autonomous systems to appear Bseemingly random^, they
must be Baccounted for .^ The expectation that the behaviours
of autonomous systems will be accountable has close parallels
with Dourish and Button’s notion of Btranslucency^ [42],
which emphasises the importance of a system’s ability to give
accounts of its own behaviour in order to render its actions
legible and thus better support human–computer interaction.
For Dourish and Button, computational accountability
is about making the inner workings of the Bblack box^
accountable to users. They provide an example of file
copying, replacing a general progress bar that glosses
computational behaviour with data buckets and the ar-
ticulation of flow strategies to elaborate the point. A
number of studies (e.g. [30, 44, 45]) have subsequently
established that revealing more of what goes on under
the hood of technological systems is often needed to
avoid a range of problems, including trust-related issues,
that could otherwise negatively impact the user’s overall
experience. However, when confronted with hypothetical
systems operating more or less autonomously, our par-
ticipants’ expectations about computational accountabili-
ty operate at a different level. Our participants were not
so much interested in making the opaque inner work-
ings of autonomous systems accountable, as they were
in making their observable behaviours accountable.
Our participants thus expect transparency to be built
into autonomous behaviours, where transparency means
the grounds of behaviour are visible and available to
account. The grounds of behaviour were spoken about
in terms of Bmotive^ and Breason^, where the former
articulates what occasions behaviour and the latter artic-
ulates what is done by an autonomous system in re-
sponse to motive. Previous enquiries into autonomous
systems, such as a study by Lim et al. [46], have
stressed the importance of computer systems being able
to articulate the Bwhy^ behind autonomous actions. Our
results expand on these findings and paint a broader
picture. Of particular concern to our participants is the
articulation of on whose behalf autonomous behaviour
is occasioned, and the commensurate expectation that
whatever is being done is being done to serve and meet
end-user’s need. Consequently our participants expect
Bsimple^ accounts of autonomous behaviour i.e. ac-
counts that articulate what is being done, why and on
whose behalf.
Although our findings shift the focus away from accounts
articulating the inner workings of autonomous machines, we
do find resonance in our participants’ talk with Dourish and
Button’s notion of accountability [42] in the way in which
accountability should be expressed. As Dourish and Button
(ibid.) put it,
B … what is important … is not the account itself (the
explanation of the system’s behaviour) but rather ac-
countability in the way this explanation arises. In partic-
ular, the account arises reflexively in the course of ac-
tion, rather than as a commentary upon it ...^ (our
emphasis)
Our participants speak of autonomous systems Btelling^ users
the motives and reasons for their behaviour as a preface to
and/or in vivo feature of that behaviour rather than something
that is bolted on after the fact to provide a post hoc explana-
tion. Thus, and as Dourish and Button put it, computational
accountability Bbecomes part and parcel of ordinary interac-
tion with a computer system^.
The takeaway for design is not simply that autonomous
behaviours should be accountable to users. Rather, in express-
ing taken for granted background expectancies at work in
domestic life, our participants have articulated what an ac-
count should consist of and look like. Thus, we find that the
accountability of autonomous behaviours should not be con-
cerned with the inner workings of autonomous machines but
should instead articulate motives and reasons, detailing what
are to be done, why and on whose behalf in particular.
Furthermore, the articulation of motives and reasons should
occur as preface to and/or in vivo feature of autonomous be-
haviour, rather than an after the fact explanation. For as our
participants succinctly put it, users Bwould not like that kind of
autonomy .^
8.2 Social accountability
Social accountability moves beyond the expectation that au-
tonomous systems will make their behaviours accountable to
end-users to instead address expectations regarding the appro-
priateness of autonomous behaviour. Simply put, autonomous
behaviour may be intelligible to end-users but that does not
mean they will find it appropriate or acceptable. Acceptability
is of longstanding concern in systems design. The technology
acceptance model, or TAM, is often cited as a key approach to
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determining acceptability, being designed to measure a proto-
type’s perceived Bease of use^ and Busefulness^ [47]. While
such an approach has been said to help maximise commercial
success of novel systems [48], the TAM framework has also
been a target of criticism for its overly generic nature and
limited scope [34].
Alternatively, user experience or UX models focus on
Binterface quality^ and its impact on the Bexperiential
component^ of system use [49, 50], which leads more gener-
ally to a concern with usability in HCI. However, as Kim [51]
points out, usability is only one aspect of user acceptance, a
point underscored by Lindley et al. [34], who also note that
usabili ty studies rarely look beyond prototypical
implementations to consider broader challenges of adoption
in everyday life. Indeed, as our study demonstrates, domestic
autonomous systems introduce a range of social concerns that
extend well beyond usability, interface quality, usefulness and
ease of use to the Bfit^ of machine actions with social expec-
tancies. The need for social accountability introduces a
broader lens for considering acceptance, encompassing not
just the Bproduct^ itself, but also the social circumstances
within which it will be embedded and the implications of this
for design.
At first glance, it may be thought that social accountability
is an external prerogative, something that cannot be built into
autonomous systems insofar as it turns on user perceptions of
what constitutes appropriate behaviour and is therefore a sub-
jective matter. However, this is not the case, (a) because ap-
propriateness is an intersubjective (social) matter as clearly
articulated in the background expectancies our participants
share, and (b) in articulating those background expectancies,
it became evident that there is much for design to do in terms
of supporting or enabling social accountability.
Thus, from a design perspective, it is clear that our partic-
ipants expect autonomous systems to be responsive to the
particular social circumstances in which their behaviours are
embedded. There is a need then for autonomous systems to
takewhat people are doing into account, not opening windows
for example when human behaviour might be disrupted by
such an action, and to tailor autonomous behaviours around
the social context in which they operate. In other words, in
addition to being autonomous, such systems also need to be
context aware if their behaviours are to be seen and treated not
only as intelligible but as intelligibly appropriate given the
specific social conditions in which their actions are situated.
A key expectation in this regard is that autonomous sys-
tems effectively exhibit social competence. There is little to be
obtained but trouble from automatically reordering foodstuffs,
for example, if it is done without respect to the social conse-
quences of doing so, and not in general but for the particular
cohort that inhabits a particular home. Thus, autonomous sys-
tems need to act with respect to human agency and entitlement
and tailor their behaviour around the differential rights and
privileges at work in the home. Autonomous systems’ will
in effect need to become social agents whose actions comply
with the mundane expectations governing domestic life if they
are to assume a trusted place in within it.
That autonomous systems are trustworthy is a critical ex-
pectation [52], which also turns on their demonstrably acting
in end-users’ interests. This is not only a matter of computa-
tional accountability and making autonomous behaviours in-
telligible to people. It is also and effectively a matter of mak-
ing it visible that actions done are done for you and not, for
example, for the benefit of an external party. Thus in addition
to exhibiting social competence, the behaviours of autono-
mous systems must also be accountable to end-user’s interests
if they are to assume trusted status. Of particular note, here is
the accountability of data—the oil that lubricates the autono-
mous machine—and transparency of data flows, coupled with
tools to enable end-users to limit them and even close them off
if it is deemed that the machine is not acting in their interests.
The takeaway for design is that social accountability is
distinct from computational accountability: the latter speaks
to the intelligibility of autonomous behaviours, the former to
their appropriateness and acceptability. Social accountability
brings with it the need to build context awareness and trust
into autonomous systems. Context awareness is needed to
enable autonomous systems to respond appropriately to the
particular social circumstances in which their behaviours are
embedded, and trust is an essential condition of their uptake in
everyday life. It requires that computational agency exhibit
social competence and that autonomous behaviour complies
with the differential rights and privileges at work in any par-
ticular home (i.e. not generalised rights and privileges but
situationally specific rights and privileges). Trust also requires
that autonomous behaviours are accountable to end-user’s in-
terests and turns on the transparency of data flows and ability
to control them.
8.3 Coordination and control
We treat coordination and control together here as they may be
seen to directly complement one another and span a spectrum
of expectations to do with the orchestration of autonomous
and human behaviours. Our findings also make it visible that
context awareness is seen as key to coordination by our par-
ticipants to ensure that autonomous systems do not make in-
appropriate interventions. However, as Bellotti and Edwards
[41] point out, in order to become acceptable, systems cannot
rely purely on context awareness to do things automatically on
our behalf but should rather involve active input from users at
least on some level. Similarly, Whitworth [53] argues that
computing systems often have a poor understanding of con-
text, which makes it necessary to give users control in order to
preserve their autonomy. An issue underscored by Yang and
Newman [1], who have argued that optimal user experience
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should be achieved through balancing machine intelligence
with direct user control.
Our study unveils a similar sense of scepticism regarding
the ability of fully autonomous systems to correctly assess
every given situation and act in line with our expectations
on a consistent basis. A key expectation at work here concerns
the timeliness of autonomous behaviours and the need to syn-
chronise them with the user’s situation. Our participants’ ex-
pectations regarding timeliness are of particular note, includ-
ing, but moving beyond, a Bhere and now^ understanding of
timeliness (e.g. raising potentially embarrassing matters while
I am entertaining visitors). Of equal concern are the temporal
horizon of action and the need for autonomous systems to be
sensitive and responsive to temporally distributed patterns of
human behaviour (e.g. long work schedules).
Our participants therefore expect that human input will be
required, which they speak about in terms of Bcustomisation^
and user-driven Bscheduling^ of events. In this respect, it is
expected that customisation would allow users to coordinate
the behaviours of autonomous systems with occasional and
established patterns of human conduct (e.g. long but not per-
manent work schedules and the reoccurring rhythms and rou-
tines of domestic life). This would allow users to configure
appropriate actions and help address the thorny problem of
how autonomous systems are to develop an awareness of con-
text, including what it is appropriate to do and when it is
appropriate to do it. In effect, the problem of learning context
is offloaded onto the user to some extent through the provision
of coordination mechanisms that enable users to gear the be-
haviours of autonomous systems in with everyday life in the
particular domestic environments they are deployed and used.
The qualification Bto some extent^ is important here, for no
matter how much they learn about everyday life, and how
smart they become, autonomous systems will never be able
to anticipate and respond appropriately to all social circum-
stances [54]. Thus, it is expected that end-users will be able to
exert direct control over autonomous systems. However, the
expectation is not that users will simply be able to turn auton-
omous systems off—that may only be necessary in critical
situations—but rather that direct control can be exercised on
a Bsliding scale^. In effect, it is expected that the intelligence
built into autonomous systems would be subject to granular
control, with levels of intelligence being increased and de-
creased according to circumstance.
The takeaway for design is that potential end-users do not
expect autonomous systems to act independently of user in-
put. End-users expect that autonomous systems will be re-
sponsive to context and act in timely fashion, where Btimely^
means they are responsive not only to what happens Bhere and
now^ but also what happens over time. It is thus expected that
autonomous systems will gear their behaviours in with occa-
sional and established patterns of human conduct, and that
mechanisms be provided to enable users to configure
autonomous behaviours around human schedules to enable
effective orchestration and synchronisation. It is expected
too that users will be able to exercise vary levels of control
over the behaviour of autonomous systems in order to make
them responsive to the inevitable contingencies of everyday
life in the home.
8.4 Design challenges
The background expectancies articulated by our participants
elaborate several distinct design challenges for the develop-
ment of autonomous systems for domestic use. These include
the following:
– Building accountability into the behaviours of autono-
mous systems by articulating motives and reasons for
autonomous behaviours as a preface to and in vivo feature
of those behaviours. What we mean here is different from
the literature stressing the need to reveal inner workings
of a system (e.g. [42]); instead we are concerned with the
overarching motivations and agendas that drive an auton-
omous system’s decision-making.
– Building context awareness into autonomous behaviours
to enable autonomous systems to respond appropriately
to the particular social circumstances in which their be-
haviours are embedded. Drawing on a rich body of
existing research in context-aware systems (e.g. [41]),
the unique challenge is the interactional nature of context
articulated most prominently by Dourish [55].
– Building social competence into computational agency to
ensure that autonomous behaviour complies with the dif-
ferential rights and privileges at work in the home in order
to engender end-user’s trust. This challenge is distinct
from existing work on roles for example in multi-agent
systems [56] in that design solutions need to respond to
the enacted and fluid ways in which rights and privileges
are negotiated on an ongoing basis.
– Building transparency into the data flows that drive au-
tonomous behaviours and data flow controls to further
engender user trust. This design challenge can build on
initial work in human–data interaction [57], putting for-
ward new models of personal data aligned with GDPR.
– Building coordination mechanisms into autonomous sys-
tems to enable users to configure autonomous behaviours
around occasional and established patterns of human con-
duct in the home. While home automation has made sig-
nificant progress, multi-occupancy is a remaining chal-
lenge that has rendered for example a Blearning
thermostat^ virtually unusable for families [1].
– Building control mechanisms into autonomous systems
to enable users to exercise vary levels of control over
the behaviour of autonomous systems in the home.
While for example occupancy-sensitive home automation
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has been explored [29], our work seeks to draw attention
to the numerous remaining challenges concerning how to
best bring the human back into the loop [58].
These are not requirements for autonomous systems in that
they do not specify just what should be done or built to address
them. Rather, they elaborate problem spaces and topics for
design to explore. While we are aware of ongoing research
that touches upon the above issues in various ways (e.g. [54,
57, 59, 60]), it is not clear, for example, what it would mean in
practice to articulate the motives and reasons for autonomous
behaviours in the in vivo course of their performance. Would
an account have to be provided every time some behaviour
occurred or only sometimes and only with respect to certain
behaviours? It can be readily anticipated that constant articu-
lation of motives and reasons would become an annoying
nuisance having a negative impact on the acceptability of
autonomous systems, particularly where relatively trivial be-
haviours are concerned.
The problem of course is that it is nigh impossible to
say what constitutes Btrivial^ (or significant) behaviour
in the absence of social context. Thus, a key research
challenge here lies not only in building accountability
into autonomous behaviours but also in working out
how to best support the delivery of accounts to end-
users. Ditto building context awareness, social compe-
tence, transparency, coordination and control in autono-
mous systems, which is to say that what any of these
topics might look like and amount to in practice has yet
to be determined and can only be determined through
significant research effort.
Nonetheless, there is sufficient generality built into
these design challenges for them to be widely applied
in the design of autonomous systems. They might, in
effect, be turned into a basic set of design guidelines
or fundamental questions such that on any occasion of
building an autonomous system, developers might ask
themselves if their designs respond to them. For exam-
ple, in designing an autonomous grocery system its de-
velopers might ask the following:
– Does the system give an account of what motivates its
behaviour to the user and the reasons for carrying out
particular actions [e.g. that it is ordering XYZ grocery
items because you are out of stock and they are the best
deal available]?
– Does the system respond to the social circumstances
in which it is situated [e.g. presenting accounts of a
shopping order at situationally relevant times and
places]?
– Does the system display social competence to users in
executing its behaviours [e.g. not automatically
reordering foodstuffs just because they have run out]?
– Does the system make the data it uses transparent and
allow users to control its flow [e.g. not Bsharing^ grocery
data with large supermarkets and thereby curtailing the
flow of adverts and offers?]
– Does the system allow users to coordinate their patterns
of behaviour with the system’s behaviour [e.g. to ‘share’
their calendar with the systems as a resource for schedul-
ing reordering]?
– Does the system provide users with granular choices over
levels of intelligence and autonomy [e.g. allowing users
to delegate certain aspects of grocery shopping to the
systems and to retain others for themselves]?
The brackets [] may of course be removed or, perhaps more
to the point, their content replaced with specifics concerning
the autonomous system to hand. For as with triviality and
significance, the question as to what constitutes Brespond to
social circumstances^, Bdisplay social competence^, Bmake
data use transparent^, Bcoordinate with patterns of behaviour^
and Bprovide granular choices^ are matters that will need to be
worked out with reference to the specificities of an autono-
mous system and the particular social context into which it is
to be situated and used. However, that does not mean the
questions cannot be asked, nor answers sought and found.
8.5 Limitations
It was suggested in the discussion of this paper that the novelty
of presenting breaching experiments for design is rather lim-
ited; others have beat us to it, as they have with the use of
contra-vision. However, the novelty here lies in the intentional
configuration of contra-vision scenarios to drive a workshop-
based approach to breaching experiments. This sharply con-
trasts to previous uses of breaching experiments in design to
understand Bin the wild^ deployments of technology [13–16],
not those previous approaches are homogenous.
Breaching experiments were, to the best of our knowledge,
first introduced into design in 2002 by Steve Mann [13], who
used wearable computing to create a set of Bvisible and ex-
plicit sousveillance^ performances Bthat follow Harold
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological approach to breaching
norms^. Mann’s use of breaching experiments was copybook
i.e. he sought to make trouble and thereby Bexpose hitherto
discreet, implicit, and unquestioned acts of organisational
surveillance^. The make trouble approach to breaching exper-
iments surfaced again in design in 2009, when Erika Shehan
Poole [16] sought to exploit breaching experiments to inves-
tigate Bexisting technology … related practices in domestic
settings^.
Poole asked participants in her field trial to interact with
domestic technology Bin ways that potentially disrupted the
social norms of the home^. More specifically, Beach home
received weekly Bhomework^ … intentionally designed to
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breach household technology installation, usage, and mainte-
nance practices. The assignments the first week served as
warm- up to acclimate participants to being in the study …
For the second week, the participants were instructed to have
the less technically oriented adult in the home complete the
assignments. This choice was made to disrupt the normal fam-
ily dynamic…^.
The results of Poole’s intentional efforts at disruption
Bprovided explanations of why problems with technical ad-
vice sharing and home technical maintenance persist^. Poole
subsequently recommends that breaching experiments should
be considered as Ban asset and an indispensable part of a
researcher’s toolbox for understanding existing social norms
and practices surrounding technology .^ We do not disagree
but would advise caution be exercised when deliberately
disrupting the dynamics of any social setting in which the
researcher is essentially a guest, and note an alternative ap-
proach to breaching experiments in design.
Following Mann, in 2004 Crabtree [14] introduced the no-
tion of breaching experiments not as things that necessarily
make trouble and cause disruption, but as an analytic lens on
in the wild deployments of novel technology. This approach
focuses on explicating through ethnography the Bthe contin-
gent ways in which novel technology for which no use prac-
tice exists is made to work and the interactional practices
providing for and organising that work^. In a similar vein, in
2008, Tolmie and Crabtree [15] treated novel technological
deployments in the home as breaching experiments that
Bmake tacit and taken for granted expectations visible… en-
abl[ing] us to see how even a simple arrangement of technol-
ogy can breach ordinary expectations of where technology
resides in the home, who owns it, who maintains it, and how
user experience of it is accounted for .^
However, it is not that there are at least two different ap-
proaches towards breaching experiments in design or the con-
trast between them that matters. Despite their differences, pre-
vious breaching experiments are oriented, as Poole succinctly
puts it, to existing technology and related practices, whether it
be a novel prototype or technology that has been appropriated
at scale and is well established.
We are not focused on existing technology, whether or not
it makes trouble and disrupts or provokes practice by virtue of
it having to be Bmade to work^ in the world. There is no actual
system, functionality, connectivity or interactivity in our
breaching experiments, only utopian and dystopian
envisionments of autonomous systems at work in everyday
life. Our breaching experiments are oriented to future and
emerging technology and the acceptability challenges that
confront their adoption in everyday life [34]. Rather than ex-
plicate, and even explain existing practice, they instead seek to
engage potential end-users in reasoning about the place of
future and emerging technologies in their everyday lives and
thereby inform us as to key challenges that need to be
addressed to make those technologies an acceptable feature
of everyday life at an early stage in the design life cycle,
before we have built anything. Furthermore, our breaching
experiments are done through workshops rather than perfor-
mances, field trials or ethnography.
It would appear then that there is some novelty to our
approach: we are not using breaching experiments to make
trouble or disrupt or to provide an analytic lens on existing
technology related practice and we are not conducting them in
previously practiced ways. The novelty in our approach lies in
repurposing tried and tested methods to create utopian and
dystopian scenarios that are designed to disrupt background
expectancies that organise everyday life in familiar settings (in
this case, the home), and as our findings make perspicuous
those expectancies have little to do with existing technology-
related practice too. The disruption lies in what are essentially
incongruous visions of the future depicted by contra-vision
scenarios, which in being presented to potential end-users cre-
ate reality disjunctures that motivate efforts at resolution and
repair. It is in the attempt to Bresolve incongruities^ [9] and
repair the reality disjunctures they occasion that ordinarily
tacit and unspoken background expectancies are surfaced; ex-
pectancies about which people usually have Blittle or nothing
to say^ when asked [17] but which this methodological inno-
vation enables early in design.
It is also important to note that it is not the intention
in designing breaching experiments that the utopian and
dystopian futures depicted in contra-vision scenarios
should predefine problematic aspects of future or emerg-
ing technology. Their job, as outlined above, is to dis-
rupt and create a reality disjuncture, whose repair sur-
faces the taken for granted expectancies that impact fu-
ture and emerging technologies in everyday life. Does
this mean that the contra-visions limit the range of is-
sues brought up by participants, constraining them to
the incongruous topics depicted in the contra-vision sce-
narios? The vignettes presented above would suggest
not, insofar as our participants talk and reasoning can
be seen to range across a great many matters not
depicted in the contra-visions. It would be more appo-
site, then, to see the contra-visions not as pre-defining
design issues or topics but as provocative social objects
that elicit multiple background expectancies, which par-
ticipants themselves come to shape and prioritise in
their talk as they go about resolving the incongruities
they create.
In breaching taken for granted background expectan-
cies that are usually left unspoken, our utopian and
dystopian scenarios have elaborated significant chal-
lenges for the design of autonomous systems in the
home. It might be countered that these are grand claims
to make on the basis of 32 people’s say so. However,
while articulated by a relatively small number of people,
Pers Ubiquit Comput
the background expectancies they have expressed do not
belong to them alone. As Garfinkel [17] put it,
BAlmost alone among sociological theorists, the late
Alfred Schutz, in a series of classical studies of the con-
stitutive phenomenology of the world of everyday life,
described many of these seen but unnoticed background
expectancies. He called them the ‘attitude of daily life’.
He referred to their scenic attributions as the ‘world
known in common and taken for granted’.^
The attitude of daily life, the world known in common,
or in other words what anyone i.e. (with Bittner’s cave-
at [61]) Bany normally competent, wide awake adult^
[53] knows about everyday life. There is nothing special
about our findings then. They do not speak of and elab-
orate rarefied knowledge or insight possessed by a
privileged few. Rather, the background expectancies ar-
ticulated by our participants are known in common,
shared, used, recognised and relied upon by a much
larger cohort, and it is for this reason that they elaborate
significant challenges for the design of autonomous sys-
tems for the home.
9 Conclusion
People’s expectations of domestic autonomous systems are
poorly understood at this point in time. We have therefore
sought to engage prospective users from the early stages of
design, not least because it is widely acknowledged that social
expectations concerning the intelligibility and trustworthiness
of autonomous systems are as important to their adoption as
proposed technological benefits. Our engagement with pro-
spective users exploits a novel design methodology that com-
bines traditional scenario-based design with a contra-vision
approach to develop utopian and dystopian visions of the au-
tonomous home that are designed to breach common sense
reasoning and surface taken for granted background expectan-
cies that impact the adoption of future and emerging
technologies.
This methodological contribution may be exploited more
generally but in the case reported here, the forward-looking
visions built into our breaching experiments are based on ap-
plication areas where autonomous systems are expected to
make a substantial impact on domestic life. The utopian and
dystopian characters of these visions disturb common sense
reasoning and create a reality disjuncture that warrants repair.
It is in repairing or resolving the incongruity between utopian
and dystopian visions that the usually unspoken background
expectancies that people use to make sense of and order fa-
miliar settings and scenes in everyday life, including the uses
of technology, are articulated and expressed or made visible
and thus become available to our consideration.
The substantive contribution of this paper thus reveals that
people expect computational and social accountability be built
into domestic autonomous systems, along with coordination
and control mechanisms. Computational accountability means
it is expected that the behaviours of autonomous systems will
be made accountable to end-users. Social accountability
means it is expected that the behaviours of autonomous sys-
tems will not only be legible but situationally appropriate and
responsive to social context. Coordination means it is expect-
ed that autonomous systems will gear in with discrete patterns
of conduct in the home. Control means that it is expected that
the intelligence built into autonomous systems will be subject
to granular choice.
The results of our breaching experiments do not provide
requirements for autonomous systems but acceptability chal-
lenges elaborating a number of discrete but interrelated prob-
lem spaces and topics that concern the nature of accountabil-
ity, context awareness, computational agency, data transpar-
ency and the role of intelligence in the future smart home.
What these challenges amount to in practice has yet to be
determined. Nonetheless, the expectations are significant and
enable fundamental questions to be asked of autonomous sys-
tems during their design. Answering them is central to the
widespread adoption of autonomous systems in domestic life.
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